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Abstract
Many assessments of climate change fail to consider the possibility of low probability,
yet catastrophic, outcomes of greenhouse warming. A noteworthy example is the
potential rapid deterioration of the West Antarctic ice sheet. If the ice sheet were to melt,
as a minority of scientists believe it may, sea levels could rise by five meters or more in
the next century. This study seeks to develop a theory that can predict why certain classes
of assessments assess extreme outcomes, while other classes of assessments ignore them.
Work in behavioral psychology argues that individual decision-makers display
predictable bias when interpreting low probability events, either underestimating or
overestimating the associated risks. Drawing on this work, this study theorizes that
assessors who operate by consensus, and who are trying not to create controversy, will
avoid issue areas, such as low probability outcomes, where biased interpretations are
likely. Staff advisors who are asked to assess such issue areas will seek to offer
explanations that overcome people’s propensity for bias. Finally, advocates writing
assessments will seek to take advantage of people’s bias. Using a case study of the West
Antarctic ice sheet issue, this study finds empirical evidence that supports these
predictions.
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Of all the possible effects of climate change, the sudden deterioration of the West
Antarctic ice sheet is one of the least likely, and yet one of the more disastrous. Most
evidence points to the inherent stability of the marine based ice, yet scientists have not
entirely eliminated the possibility that it could collapse in the next hundred years, due to
warming caused by anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. If it were to deteriorate, sea
levels would rise by as much as ten meters, flooding vast areas of coastal floodplain and
urban development. So even if the possibility of the ice sheet’s sudden collapse is
trivially low, we would still expect responsible climate experts to discuss its potential.
When measured in terms of expected damages—the probability of the event times its
magnitude—the threat of the sudden collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet may well be
as important as other, more likely outcomes of global climate change.
Several of the larger assessments in recent years have not explained the likelihood of the
West Antarctic ice sheet deterioration. One example is the Second Assessment Report of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Working Group III, which did
not discuss the issue. In that same assessment, one finds little attention given to other
“surprise” scenarios. Rather, the volume focuses almost exclusively on the implications
of the most likely outcome. Why should the assessment community largely ignore
impacts and outcomes of climate change that are deemed unlikely yet possible, when the
scientific community continues to publish findings related to these events?
Several explanations have been suggested for the failure of many assessments to give
serious treatment to outlier possibilities. One view is that scientists want to protect their
legitimacy, and hence avoid issues that are out of the scientific mainstream. This
explanation fails in three respects. First, one often observes scientists tackling issues that
are associated with small probabilities, whether it is investigating the possibility of life on
Mars, or attempting to find a cure for AIDS. Second, one would expect that as the
2number of scientists in a particular field decreased, because the issue is considered
an outlier, some scientists would perceive a greater possibility of making original
findings. If one treats the choice of research topics as a competitive market, there should
always be some scientists in every niche of research. Third, and in the case of West
Antarctica most important, is that the science itself is being done. Contributions to
journals such as Nature and Science are frequent. For example, a number of scientists
have devoted their careers to studying the stability of the West Antarctic ice sheet, and
the possibility that it will collapse rapidly as a result of anthropogenic climate change.
Rather, one observes a paucity of assessments that discuss the issue seriously. Something
about assessors, distinguished from scientists, makes them reluctant to examine extreme
events.
I propose that a model of strategic action by assessors, combined with their knowledge
that decision makers display systematic bias when presented with low probability risks,
can offer a more accurate and more useful explanation. The model explains why some
groups, such as the environmental advocacy community, might wish to highlight the
“tails” of the distribution. Other groups, consensus seekers like the IPCC, might shy away
from even mentioning the possibility of surprise. I test the model using multivariate
regression analysis, and find significant correlation between the type of assessment and
the treatment of a particular extreme outcome, in accordance with the theoretical model.
This paper follows the following outline. In Part 2, I discuss the literature in behavioral
psychology and decision theory that relates to the framing of risk and uncertainty. I can
not hope to cover all of the literature in this area. Rather, I seek to provide an
understanding of some of the ways that people typically depart from a “rational actor”
model in situations involving risk and uncertainty. This discussion contributes to the
paper by providing the basis for assumptions about how people may react to assessments,
and why reactions to events of low probability may be especially subject to issue framing
by assessors. In Part 3, I discuss the theory of a possible West Antarctic ice sheet
collapse. The purpose of this discussion is not so much to convince readers that such an
event will or will not occur, but to give a feel for the lack of understanding surrounding
this issue and others of its type. Because of the high level of uncertainty and low
probability of this outcome, I choose it as a case study to test the model. In Part 4, I apply
the theories from Part 2 to the study of assessments of climate change. Because my model
relies upon the assumption of rational strategic behavior on the part of those doing
assessments, I attempt to distinguish different motives associated with different types of
assessment. Thus, I categorize assessments according to their motive, and use that
categorization to predict the treatment of extreme events. I use the example of West
Antarctica, from Part 3, to ground the discussion and hypotheses in a real issue area. In
Part 5 I test the hypotheses by examining the treatment of West Antarctic ice sheet issue
by a set assessments. I rely on quantitative tests, using both multinomial logit and
standard logit regression models, in which I control for several other variables, such as
the year in which a given assessment was written. Because the sample size is small, I
supplement these regressions with a simulation using the non-parametric bootstrap
technique. My purpose is to examine whether a correlation does exist between type of
3assessment and the treatment given to extreme events. In Part 6, I discuss the
implication of the model presented in this paper for assessors and for policy makers.
2. Objective and Subjective Risk Assessments
A body of research points to the failure of most decision-makers to take proper account
of outcome probability distributions. The literature points to people’s difficulty and
unwillingness to compare and analyze risks when making decisions. People are especially
bad at making decisions when assessed outcomes have probabilities very close to one or
zero. They display systematic bias in over weighting the chance of very low probability
events, and under weighting very high probability events. Their decisions in these
contexts are highly sensitive to how problems are framed.
Some of the earliest, and best known, work in this field was conducted by Daniel
Kahneman and Amos Tversky, both psychologists, who called their work “prospect
theory”.ii The initial basis for prospect theory lay in three empirical observations: (1)
people tend to demonstrate risk averse behavior with respect to potential positive changes
in wealth; (2) people tend to demonstrate risk taking behavior with respect to negative
changes in wealth; (3) people tend to place more emphasis on potential losses in wealth
than to equally sized gains in wealth. That is, a gain of $2,000 dollars is less than twice as
good as a gain of $1,000, a loss of $2,000 is less than twice as bas as a loss of $1,000, and
the magnitude of the loss of value associated with losing $1,000 is greater than the
magnitude of gain of value associated with a gain of $1,000. Figure 1 represents this
function.
People who are confronted with the choice between a certain outcome of a net gain in
wealth, and a risky gamble that has the same mathematical expected payoff as the certain
outcome, usually choose the certain outcome. The same people, however, when
confronted with a choice between a certain negative outcome and a gamble over losses
with the same mathematical expected payoff, will prefer to take the gamble. For example,
Tversky and Kahneman posed a hypothetical situation to a group of people: a rare disease
is breaking out in a community, and is expected to kill 600 people. With treatment A, 200
people will be saved for sure. With treatment B, there is a two-thirds chance that nobody
will be saved, and a one-third chance that all 600 people will be saved. Over 70% of
those surveyed preferred treatment A. Tversky and Kahneman posed the same problem to
a different group, but phrased the implications differently. If treatment C is adopted, 400
people will die for sure. If treatment D is adopted, there is a two-thirds chance that 600
people will die, and a one-third chance that nobody will die. In this case, over 70% of
those surveyed preferred treatment D. As is apparent, treatments A and C were the same,
as were B and D, yet people’s preferences changed when confronted with the possibility
of gain or loss. In this case, people’s decisions were sensitive to how the question is
framed, whether it was framed as a choice involving risks of gains or risks of losses.
A second finding of prospect theory is that people keep separate mental accounts. For
instance, people were posed a hypothetical situation involving theater tickets, which cost
$40 each. Imagine that you have already bought the ticket, the researchers asked, but
4when you arrive at the theater, you find it missing. Do you buy another one? Most
people said no, citing $80 as too much to spend on a single theater ticket. Imagine,
however, that you have yet to buy the ticket, and just as you arrive at the theater to
purchase it you discover that you have lost two twenty dollar bills from your wallet. Do
you still purchase the ticket? Most people said yes, noting that the missing $40 had
nothing to do with the price of the theater ticket. In each case, one has a choice between
being forty dollars poorer, or eighty dollars poorer but well entertained. People’s
decisions appear sensitive to how losses are categorized.
Tversky and Kahneman identify four key assumptions implicit in a normative decision
theory based on “rational” utility functions. The first is cancellation, also known as the
elimination of irrelevant alternatives. For example, if I prefer winning A to winning B,
then I should prefer winning A if it rains tomorrow than winning B if it rains tomorrow,
unless they are weather dependent, such as playing tennis outside or going skating inside.
The second is transitivity. If I prefer A to B, and prefer B to C, then I must prefer A to C.
The third assumption is dominance, or more strongly, stochastic dominance. One option
purely dominates another if in every possible state of the world it has an outcome at least
as good. It stochastically dominates the other if across all levels of cumulative
probability, it has an outcome that is superior. The final assumption of expected utility
theory is invariance: different representation of the same problem should yield the same
result. We have already seen this fail in the case of the 600 sick people.
To see how these assumptions about rational behavior fail in practice, Tversky and
Kahneman identify two distinct phases of the decision process. In the first phase, a
preliminary analysis of the problem, people frame the effective acts, contingencies, and
outcomes. During this phase, people note what they perceive to be dominant, dominated,
and irrelevant alternatives. Since the level of analysis is not deep in this stage, people are
highly susceptible to how a problem is framed, for they tend to draw out those
conclusions that are most obvious. Imagine a problem involving a case of stochastic
dominance. States A, B, and C are each equally likely outcomes of a lottery. I should
prefer the gamble for one dollar in state A, five dollars in state B, and ten dollars in state
C to the gamble for four dollars in state A, ten dollars in state B, and one dollar in state C.
The two possible lotteries are presented below:
Many people, in their preliminary analysis, might convert the problem into one where
they see that in two of the three states (A and B), Option 2 provides the better payoff,
whereas in one of the three states (C), Option 1 is preferable. In the first stage, people do
not typically go so far as to rearrange the boxes as follows, where it is obvious that
Option 1 is the better choice:
The level of analysis that reveals that Option 1 stochastically dominates Option 2 would
probably not be reached. Instead, people make their preliminary framing, and then enter
the second phase of deciding, in which they select the prospect of highest value. The first
part of the decision process often determines the final outcome.
Because the analysis in the first stage is not as deep, this stage is highly susceptible to
how problems are presented, as well as by “norms, habits, and expectations” of the
decision maker (Tversky and Kahneman 1988, 172). The first stage of decision can
5include people’s emotional reactions to a problem. The bias that can result in the first
stage of decision, due to mistaken judgments about dominated or irrelevant alternatives,
can lead to people’s violating each of the four assumptions underlying the normative
model of decision making under uncertainty. Problems that are prone to misevaluation in
the critical first step of the process are most sensitive to the manner in which they are
framed and presented.
An important result of this bifurcated decision process is that events are not necessarily
weighted according to their true probabilities. Events with probabilities very close to zero
register in the first stage of the decision process as having some positive probability;
often, they are over weighted. Events with probabilities very close to one register in the
first stage of the decision process as being less than sure outcomes; often, they are under
weighted. Students of decision theory are often given the following hypothetical choice:
between two lotteries, A and B. Lottery A involves a 99% chance of winning $1000, and a
1% chance of winning nothing. Lottery B involves a 100% chance to win $900. Most
subjects choose option B. They are then given the choice between two other lotteries, C
and D. Lottery C involves a 90% chance to win $5000, and a 10% chance to win nothing.
Lottery D involves an 89% chance to win $5050, and an 11% chance to win nothing.
Most subjects prefer lottery D. The lotteries can be seen in terms of payoffs for each level
of probability in the table below:
In both cases, people tend to pick the outcome with the lower expected value, although in
the first case their answer minimizes the variance of the expected outcome, while in the
second case it maximizes it. One explanation for this result is that they place too much
emphasis on the 1% chance of failure in lottery A, a probability close to zero. At the same
time, they tend to disregard the difference between the 90% chance of success in lottery
C and the 89% chance of success in lottery D.
Figure 2 represents this graphically, and shows how the actual relationship between
objective and subjective probabilities differs from what a rational actor model would
predict. Probabilities that have an objective value quite close to zero tend to be magnified
in subjective assessments. Likewise, probabilities that are close to one tend to be
diminished. In between, the slope of the observed relationship between objective and
subjective probabilities is less steep than the expected 45° line linking the two. Thus, an
increase in objective probability that is somewhere near the middle of the diagram will
have a very small impact on one’s subjective probability assessment. Once an event
reaches some threshold level of being perceived as having a probability between zero and
one, the actual range within which most people place it tends to lie approximately
between twenty-five and seventy-five percent.
A number of authors have attempted to identify what factors cause people to worry about
a risk. Perhaps the best known set of factors is a list developed by Vincent Covello,
presented in Table 4. According to Covello, whether people tend to magnify or diminish
a particular risk depends on a set of attributes of that risk. For instance, if a risk tends to
cause fatalities grouped in time and space, is unfamiliar, and is caused by a mechanism
that is not well understood, people will tend to magnify the risk in their minds, and worry
about it more. If, by contrast, a risk tends to cause fatalities that are scattered and non-
6identifiable, and due to a familiar process that is well understood, people will tend to
diminish the risk, and worry about it less. For risks that are close to zero probability, this
magnification or diminishment could be enough to place a risk into the category of close
to 50-50 chances, or alternatively off the screen altogether. Likewise an actor whose job
it is to communicate a risk, and who wants people to worry about the risk, will tend to
frame the risk in terms of categories in the middle column of Table 5. If we think that
many risks have multiple attributes, some controllable and some not, for instance, we
might think that it is always possible for the communicator to choose aspects of the risk
that will magnify or diminish the risk in people’s minds.
Margolis (1996) criticizes Table 4 by claiming that it measures effects, and not causes, of
subjective risk amplification. If a person cares about the risk, he or she will tend to
perceive the attributes of the risk as falling in the middle column; for instance judging
fatalities as grouped in time or space. For mixed attribute risks, people can choose to
classify them in any number of ways. People may choose to focus on the elements of the
risk that are most bothersome. Margolis asks what relationship between the risk and the
individual might make them make that choice.
As a step in this analysis, Margolis claims that a risk must fall somewhere on the risk
matrix in Figure 3. People use simple heuristics to classify risks, and tend to see them as
belonging to one of the four boxes in his risk matrix. For risks with clearly identified
dangers, but not clearly identified benefits, people use the notion of “better safe than
sorry”, and place the risk into the second box. By contrast, if the dangers coming from
the risk are not clearly identified, yet the benefits are, people use the notion of “waste not,
want not”, and proceed with the action, danger and all, since “life is dangerous” and
“nothing ventured, nothing gained.” When both dangers and opportunities are clearly
identified, the risk falls into the first box, one of fungible outcomes. According to
Margolis, this box is inherently unstable, and tends to shunt its contents into boxes 2 or 3,
depending on which set of attributes, dangers or opportunities, are perceived as the more
important. Risks in Box 4 stay there, unless new information places them in one of the
other boxes.
The fact that people move risks out of Box 1 and into boxes 2 and 3 comes about because
people like to be guided by basic intuition. It is easier to decide a matter in line with an
intuition of “better safe than sorry” or “waste not want not” than to weigh carefully the
costs and benefits of action, to think carefully and to have regret. Which intuition governs
depends, in Margolis’ view, on three factors: fungibility, framing, and fairness.
Fungibility he defines as direct experience with either the dangers or opportunities of the
risk. Framing he defines as “loss framing”, whether the risk is perceived as a negative
departure from the status quo, or one the removal of which would be framed as a benefit.
As we know from Figure 1, perceived losses are going to affect people more than gains.
Fairness he sees as whether the dangers and opportunities of the risky action affect the
same people. Margolis compares people’s perception of dioxin and aflatoxin. The former
is not very fungible—most people have no direct experience with the chemical. However,
because dioxin results from human causes, like defoliants used in the Vietnam War, it
gets framed as a loss. Furthermore, the people who suffer from dioxin, war veterans, for
instance—are well defined, while the beneficiaries of dioxin are not. The results seem
7unfair. With aflatoxin, the benefits are fungible, since the major source of the
chemical is peanut butter, and people like peanut butter. The chemical is not framed as a
loss—peanut butter is natural, part of life. Finally, the ones who suffer the loss are the
same ones who get the benefit—people who eat peanut butter. People accept aflatoxin as
part of life, and would perceive efforts to make peanut butter safer as a waste of their
resources. Having made up their mind about the appropriate intuition to use, and thus
putting the risk into Box 2 or Box 3, people use the attributes in Table 4 to justify their
decision.
Another branch of literature examines how people come to understand risks accurately.
In the 1980s, Ortwin Renn conducted a series of focus groups in Germany, in which he
sought to understand people’s responses to and perceptions of environmental risks. First,
he found that the lay public understood the nature of tradeoffs best when the discussion
involved several different approaches, including examples of tradeoffs with which people
were familiar. Second, he made a set of findings that highlighted the importance of
people’s values, rather than their statistical fluency. People do not want to think
probabilistically, and avoid doing so even if they are able to do so, and even if avoidance
leads to sub-optimal choices. His findings are as follows:
1. Most people do not share the “value judgment” in technical risk analysis to
give equal weight to probability and magnitude, and overly differentiate
between low-probability high-magnitude risks and high-probability low-
magnitude risks having the same expected value.
2. The difference between expert and lay attitudes towards risk is not caused by
the inability of lay people to understand simple statistics, but in their values
making them unwilling to think in terms of expected outcomes.
3. Risk education fails when it tries to induce people to think in terms of
expected values.
4. Communication that focuses on exchanging information on perspectives and
value systems, without claiming one or another position to be superior, does
well at inducing people to understand the risks involved in more statistical
terms, and to compromise on various tradeoffs involved in choosing among
competing risks (Renn 1991, 470-471).
A related question is whether policy makers react to risk issues in the same way as the
general public. Studies of managers and administrators in the public and private sectors
indicate that policy makers are not necessarily better than lay people in making decisions.
They tend to fall into the same traps of bounded rationality and misperception of
probabilities that plague most people. (March 1988). For instance, when Kahneman and
Tversky performed their experiment, in which subjects could choose to save 200 people
out of 600, or all 600 with a 33% chance of success, they found that doctors performed
no more in accordance with a rational actor model than members of the lay public.
(Kahneman and Tversky 1988). Shlyakhter et al. (1994) found that energy models were
subject to consistent and predictable biases. Gordon and Kammen (1996) found a similar
result in forecasts of stock behavior. Both of these involved predictions by experts in a
8field. But Kammen et al. (1994) note instances when trained experts in
government, such as physicians who decide matters of public health, do perceive risks
correctly, but face a voting public that insists on another interpretation. We could
anticipate, then, that whether a policy maker falls victim to the standard misperception of
risks would depend on a number of factors. First, we might expect some bureaucrats to be
trained experts in the particular policy field, and thus to understand the nature of the risks
involved. Decisions that are subject to their discretion may receive proper analysis.
Second, we might expect members of congress or parliament, who are rarely scientific
experts, to perform little better than the lay public. Third, we would expect that in the
context of decisions that are highly publicized, policy makers would be more likely to
follow public, rather than expert, opinion. Perhaps the best example of this is with the
issue of nuclear energy. (Dooley 1987) In these cases, policy makers would perform no
better than the lay public.
3. Rapid Deterioration of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet
In 1978, J.H. Mercer, a glaciologist from Ohio State University, published an article in
the journal Nature, in which he hypothesized that the West Antarctic ice sheet could
disintegrate rapidly if a number of ice shelves, the floating masses of ice at the fringe of
the ice sheet, were to deteriorate, something possible under a global warming scenario.
Building on theory developed four years earlier by J. Weertman, he noted that the ice
shelves buttress the ice sheet behind them, blocking what would otherwise be a rapid
stream of ice into the sea. Since the West Antarctic ice sheet appears to be a marine ice
sheet, resting not on dry land but on a bed well below sea level, it could undergo a rapid
change. Two ice shelves in particular, the Ross ice shelf and the Ronne-Filchner ice shelf,
potentially hold the entire West Antarctic ice sheet together, and prevent it from
collapsing into the sea adjacent to the Antarctic peninsula. However, these two ice
shelves are themselves fragile. In order to survive, they require mean summer (January)
temperatures to remain below 0°C. This is roughly equivalent to having mean annual
temperatures remain below –5°C. At present, their climatic zone is well below this
threshold. Since its original publication, Mercer’s theory has received attention from both
the scientific literature and the popular press. Here, I present an overview both of the
theory, the controversy surrounding it, and the attention it received in the public eye.
To clarify discussion of Mercer’s argument, Figure 4 shows the geography of Antarctica.
The Antarctic ice sheet falls into two general geographic regions. The large East
Antarctic ice sheet covers most of the continent, and rests on land mass which itself is
above sea level. It is a relatively stable glacial formation. The smaller West Antarctic ice
sheet covers the smaller portion of the continent, and is more heterogeneous in nature.
Parts of it rest on land mass that are above sea level. Much of it, however, is a marine
glacial formation, either floating or resting on land mass that is below sea level. It is less
stable than the East Antarctic ice sheet, which rests entirely on ground that is above sea
level.
Mercer hypothesized that global warming, due to increased concentrations of CO2 in the
atmosphere, could threaten these ice shelves. He noted that predictions called for a rise in
9global mean surface temperature of 3°C due to a doubling of GHG concentrations.
However, he noted, general circulation models predict the warming to be more
pronounced at high latitudes. Thus, it is not unreasonable to predict a warming of 10°C to
15°C in the arctic and Antarctic regions. Such warming would, he said, put the Ross and
Ronne-Filchner ice shelves at risk, for currently they lie at an isotherm of approximately
–10°C in January. If these ice shelves were to be confronted with a 0°C January isotherm,
they could rapidly disintegrate, leading to the rapid, perhaps even catastrophic,
deglaciation of the entire West Antarctic region. Such a deglaciation would raise sea
levels by as much as 5 meters.
Mercer distinguished this breakup of the West Antarctic ice sheet from the very different
effect that global warming would have on the larger East Antarctic ice sheet. First, the
East Antarctic ice sheet, because of its land base, can remain viable up to temperatures as
much as 10°C warmer than the critical temperatures for the West Antarctic ice sheet.
Second, were the East Antarctic ice sheet to melt, it would do so slowly. Rather than
disintegrate, as the West Antarctic ice sheet would do, the East Antarctic ice sheet would
slowly receded to higher latitudes. Although it would raise sea levels by as much as 50
meters, were it to melt, that melting process would take several centuries. Furthermore,
there is some evidence that warmer temperatures could actually increase snowfall on the
East Antarctic ice sheet, meaning that with global warming it would actually grow
thicker. Mercer presented this evidence, but also said that any rate of increase in the East
Antarctic ice sheet would not be fast enough to counter the more rapid disintegration of
the West Antarctic ice sheet.
A series of events have unfolded fairly close to Mercer’s predictions. Mercer predicted
that the precursor to the failure of the Ross and Ronne-Filchner ice shelves would be the
disintegration of smaller ice shelves on the Antarctic Peninsula, a long finger of land that
extends northward towards Cape Horn. The Antarctic Peninsula has a climate
considerably warmer than the rest of Antarctica, and historically has projected past the
0°C January isotherm. During the 1980s, the average temperatures on and around the
Antarctic Peninsula rose faster than the global average, and the 0°C isotherm moved
south, over the Larsen B and Wordie ice shelves. As the 0°C isotherm moved over these
shelves, they disintegrated rapidly, calving large icebergs.
In the March 28, 1991 issue of Nature, Doake and Vaughan reported that the Wordie ice
shelf had broken up as a result of climatic warming in the region. They hypothesized that
large amount of melt water had seeped into the lower portions of the glacial formation,
destabilizing it and leading to a series of fractures. Further, they hypothesized that its
break up would allow the streams of ice on the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, already moving
at rates of up to 1,000 meters per year, to accelerate. In the same issue of Nature, Jay
Zwally referred to the stability of the West Antarctic ice sheet as “glaciology’s grand
unsolved problem.”
Four years later, the northern part of the Larsen ice shelf underwent a process of rapid
deterioration, this time attracting the attention of the popular press. On March 26, 1995,
the Sunday Telegraph reported
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The recent breaking off from Antarctica of an iceberg the size of Oxfordshire
has produced howls from doomsayers, who see it as the first serious sign of global
warming that could melt the icecaps and submerge the planet’s coastal cities. But
ministers meeting in Berlin this week to discuss the climate need not be too
concerned by the iceberg’s appearance. Glaciologists are convinced that the
break-off had nothing to do with global warming, and that fears of a catastrophic
rise in sea levels in the near future are groundless (Berry 1995, 19)
Later that week Newsweek ran a story on the event, describing the implications of the
new iceberg the size of Rhode Island:
The ice shelves, says glaciologist David Vaughan of the British Antarctic Survey,
“have been around for a very, very long time”; that they are piles of ice cubes
leaves no doubt that Antarctica is experiencing “regional warming.” Without
intact ice shelves to cool them, winds blowing over Antarctica will be warmer
than usual, says geophysicist Charles Ebert of the State University of New York
at Buffalo. If the winds melt even a tenth of the continent’s ice, sea levels
worldwide would rise 12 to 30 feet. . . . That prospect adds urgency to a meeting
in Berlin this week, where more than 100 countries will discuss the climate-
change treaty. . . . The Caribbean nation Trinidad and Tobago, for one, fears that
rising sea levels will turn it into the new Atlantis (Begley et al. 1995, 56).
A few days after that, the story played on National Public Radio in the United States.
Mark Meyer, a glacier expert at the University of Colorado, says the temperature
change could have been enough to bring about the dramatic changes now being
witnessed. . . . This prospect raises two questions. First, is the higher temperature
at the Antarctic Peninsula a sign of global warming due to air pollution? And
second, is the rest of the frozen continent showing any discomforting signs as
well. Meyer says scientists simply can’t answer either question. . . . The fate of
Antarctica is key in the story of global warming. If the continent’s huge ice sheets
melted, global sea levels could rise more than 20 feet, flooding many of the
world’s major cities. . . . Because there is so much natural variability though,
scientists may never know whether human activity is helping to melt the ice
shelves of the Antarctic Peninsula (Harris 1995).
Doake and Vaughan themselves reached the conclusion that the break up could be
attributed to, and was an indicator of, global climate change. In the January 25, 1996
issue of Nature they reported
On millennial time scales these retreats may not be unique or even unusual . . . but
in the short term Mercer’s predictions have been borne out, and the spatial and
temporal pattern of ice-shelf retreat is similar to that he proposed.... The pattern of
the retreat provides evidence of warming in both climatic regimes on the
Antarctic Peninsula, but due to the high spatial gradients of mean annual air
temperature, the warming was achieved by a modest migration of the climate
pattern. We have still, however, to determine the precise mechanisms whereby the
atmospheric warming had such a catastrophic effect on the ice shelves of the
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Antarctic Peninsula but it is clear that the ice shelves cannot survive periods
of warming that last more than a few decades...We cannot determine whether the
Antarctic Peninsula warming can be ascribed to a global warming magnified by
regional temperature/sea-ice feedback, or if this is a natural oscillation as a result
of the same feedback. We offer no prediction that the warming will continue, but
if it does, other ice shelves are threatened. The Filchner-Ronne and Ross ice
shelves, which may stabilize the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, are not immediately
threatened by this mechanism, as it would require a further warming of 10°C
before the -5°C mean annual isotherm reached their ice fronts.
There are signs that the warming trend in Antarctica is continuing. On February 6, 1997,
the Times reported that the 4,600 square mile Larsen B ice shelf, the southern part of the
shelf, was showing signs of stress, with “huge cracks” appearing in the ice (Hawkes
1997). The paper reported that experts predict it will disintegrate, in a manner similar to
the Larsen A ice shelf, within the next two years. The paper also reported that the
Greenpeace vessel, Arctic Sunrise, had been in the region for two weeks to document the
changes. Meanwhile, in London, Greenpeace created ice sculptures in the shape of
penguins, and left them to melt in central London. If the ice shelves melt, Greenpeace
said, the penguins will lose their homes.
Sometimes it is hard to distinguish news reports related to the breakup of the West
Antarctic ice sheet from reports speaking of sea level rise in general, due to thermal
expansion of the oceans, or a combination of the two. Often, the news reports themselves
do not draw the distinction. On the front page of its Sunday edition, the New York Times
reported that flooding in the South Pacific “has helped focus minds here on warnings that
global warming could cause the seas to rise enough in the next century or so to obliterate
island nations like [Kiribati] scattered in the middle of the Pacific Ocean.” (Kristof 1997,
1). Like other stories, this one does not speak of the possibility of the West Antarctic ice
sheet melting; rather, it discusses the implications of slight sea level rise—in the order of
50 centimeters—combined with increased storm activity.
The events on the Antarctic Peninsula coincided with two other events, which could have
led to increased visibility of the issue. One event was the Berlin Conference, the first
meeting of the delegates to the Framework Convention on Climate Change since the Rio
Earth Summit. The second was the anticipated release of the Kevin Costner film
Waterworld, in which the melting ice caps are portrayed as covering nearly all landmass
on the planet. The Houston Chronicle reassured us, however, that “if the polar ice caps
were actually to melt, the globe’s oceans would rise only between 237 feet and 240 feet.
That would cover every coastal city in the United States – as well as low-lying regions
like Florida, Louisiana and most of Texas – with water. But it wouldn’t cover the
continents.” (Houston Chronicle 1995, 2)
Mercer’s predictions have not failed to incite criticism. Some scientists have
hypothesized that the West Antarctic ice sheet is actually floating, and thus its
disintegration would have no impact on sea levels. Scientists have also attacked his claim
that it would disintegrate rapidly were it to lose the support of the northern ice shelves.
Still others claim that the rate of additional snow accumulation on the entire Antarctic
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continent would exceed the rate of disintegration of the West Antarctic ice
sheet (Jacobs 1992, 29). Finally, people take issue with the projection that temperatures
in the West Antarctic region will rise by 10°C.
Indeed the science remains far from clear, although most of it points to it being less likely
than originally thought that the ice sheet could undergo a sudden collapse. In one recent
article, Charles Bentley made the following comments on the theory:
In light of the evidence for recent stability, it is difficult to see how climate
warming (whether anthropogenic or natural) could trigger a collapse of the WAIS
(West Antarctic Ice Sheet) in the next century or two. Ice sheets take thousands of
years to respond to changes in surface temperature, because it takes that long for
the temperature changes to penetrate close to the bed and only at the bed could
increasing temperatures affect the flow rates in any major way. . . . Thus, I believe
that a rapid rise in sea level in the next century or two from a West Antarctic
cause could only occur if natural (not induced) collapse of the WAIS is imminent,
the chances of which, based on the concept of a randomly timed collapse on the
average of once every 100,000 years, are on the order of 0.1% (Bentley 1997,
1078).
After an initial bout of enthusiasm for the story of West Antarctic collapse, research has
been moving in the direction of seeing the West Antarctic ice sheet as inherently stable,
and sea level rise from its collapse as unlikely. For instance, estimates of the additional
deposition of snow on the Antarctic continent, because of warmer, wetter air, have been
revised upwards. And the streams of ice that disgorge into the Ross ice shelf appear less
ominous; indeed one of them appears to have stopped, after “it lost lubrication at its
base.” (Schneider 1997, 114).
4. A Model for Assessments
4.1 Anticipating the Reaction to Assessments
The rapid collapse of the West Antarctic ice sheet is the type of risk for which people’s
perception would be sensitive to how the risk is framed. Most importantly, the chances of
the event occurring are slight, indeed close to zero. The risk is one with a class of
identifiable effects—coastal flooding—as well as a host of potential other effects, such as
increased storm surges and loss of wildlife. Contrast with this risk the anticipated change
in mean global surface temperature of 3°C over the next century. According to best
available scientific consensus, the latter is an outcome that is likely to occur, although the
effects of the change on local conditions are uncertain.
For potential extreme outcomes of climate change, such as the rapid melting of the West
Antarctic ice sheet, we would expect people to form subjective probability assessments
that miss the mark on either side of scientists’ “objective probability”. Those people who
form a subjective risk assessment below the level of objective probability will view the
chances of rapid sea level rise as trivial. Those people who amplify the risk will see the
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chances of extreme outcomes as substantial, and likely to happen. Since the
damages to society that would result from an extreme outcome like rapid sea level rise
are large, people’s perception of the issue will have a large impact on how serious an
issue they consider climate change in general.
Applying the literature on risk perception to a model of assessments relies on three
assumptions. First, we must assume that assessors understand the nature of the risks
involved. That is, they do not suffer from the same biases that plague the general public.
Such an assumption is fully consistent with the work of Renn and others. As people
become very familiar with a risk or an uncertainty, they tend to analyze it more
methodically, and to perceive it more accurately, or at least more in accordance with the
prevailing scientific paradigm. We would expect that assessors are such experts in the
field they are assessing that would not be subject to the same biases that affect the lay
public or generalist policy makers.  Second, we must assume that assessors are aware that
most people have a difficult time interpreting risks. The assessors need not be familiar
with all of prospect theory. Rather, they might draw from personal experience in framing
risks incorrectly, or their intuition about people’s abilities. The third assumption is that
assessors—or in some cases the people who commission assessments—act strategically.
“To be strategic usually requires that we anticipate the responses of other parties,
possibly ourselves, at a later moment.” (Zeckhauser 1991, 1). Assessors will take into
account people’s difficulty understanding certain risks and uncertainties. Depending on
their motives in performing the assessment, they will write their assessments either to
avoid people’s difficulty, to overcome people’s difficulty, or to take advantage of
people’s difficulty. In order to model assessor’s strategic choice of issue framing, I first
identify the assessor’s strategic objective in performing the assessment, and categorize
the assessments accordingly. I can then use the particular strategic objective to predict the
treatment of issues involving extreme outcomes.
4.2 Categorizing Assessments by the Three A’s
In this section, I classify assessments according to the objectives of the assessors, or in
some cases authorizers, responsible for their production. The three categories are
agreement assessments, advisory assessments, and advocacy assessments. Clearly, any
attempt to classify to assessments is going to be somewhat arbitrary, both in the drawing
of borders, and in the assigning of assessments to one side or the other. My attempt at
classification is no exception. One could argue that three classes I have defined are not
the most useful, or even that they are misleading. Furthermore, many assessments will
possess features of two or even three classes. However, assessments within each of the
three classes do share many features. While not perfect, this attempt at classification is
still useful.
4.2.1 Agreement
Some assessments, like those of the IPCC, the National Research Council (NRC), and the
various agencies of the United Nations (UN), appear to be undertaken in order to reach
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consensus, or agreement, among a panel of national or global experts. Often,
governments hesitate to take action to address climate change because of a perceived lack
of information, and commission panels of experts to study the issue, as an alternative to
substantive policy. Only after these reports have given an unambiguous answer does
policy change become possible. For instance when the IPCC issued a report, in 1996, that
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions were having a “discernible impact” on climate,
the pressure for negotiators to formulate a plan to reduce that impact became far more
urgent. Countries were no longer able to hide behind the call for more research before
taking action. These types of assessments are often ongoing and lengthy efforts, made up
of a panel of experts who represent a broad range of disciplines, interest groups, and
stakeholders. The IPCC, for instance, is made up of scientists from a number of different
countries with divergent interests in the climate change debate. One of the distinguishing
features of these assessments is that the assessors participate on a volunteer basis, and not
under contract or as an employee of the agency sponsoring the assessment.
4.2.2 Advice
A second objective of assessors is the giving of advice. Many assessments are undertaken
in order to sort through difficult questions that relate to policy, and to reach the best
conclusions possible. In many cases, these assessments have been commissioned by a
group within industry or government. Often, these assessments are prepared under
contract for a specific user group or community. Indeed, many of these assessments go
unobserved, since as the property of the contracting party they may not be part of the
public domain. The experts preparing these assessments may represent a range of
disciplines, but the purpose is to bring together minds who can sort through the issues and
analyze the results, not to make sure that different political interests are heard. For
instance, the assessment “Climate Change and the Insurance Industry: Uncertainty
Among the Risk Community” was a short assessment commissioned by the insurance
industry, and prepared by a private consultant, in order to brief insurance industry
executives on the impacts of climate change on their industry. Other times it is the
employees of agencies such as the Department of Energy (DOE) who write these
assessments. In either case, the assessor is being paid to give the best and most
comprehensive piece of advice within a specifically defined area and the constraints
imposed on them by their budget and mandate. Their purpose is to serve the interests of
their audience, and they can best serve those interests by presenting a balanced, unbiased,
and objective a view of the relevant issues. A defining feature of these assessments is that
they are prepared for use within the organization paying for its preparation.
4.2.3 Advocacy
A third purpose of assessments is advocacy. To varying extents, industry groups, non-
profit and non-governmental organizations, and even government agencies have interests
at stake in the climate change issue. They prepare assessments to further those interests.
While these assessments often outwardly appear to be consensus or advisory documents,
in truth they represent one set of interests, and one set of opinions on the climate change
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issue. If they do appear to portray consensus, it is within the narrow set of
opinions they represent, and not across the spectrum of scientific views and government
stakeholders. These reports may be commissioned by an organization, but if so, they are
designed to be read primarily outside that organization. Assessments such as “A Matter
of Degrees”, prepared by Irving Mintzer of the World Resources Institute, “Solar
Revolution: Insurers and Bankers Waking Up To Climate Change”, found on the
Greenpeace web site fall into this category. Whether overt or not, the purpose of these
assessments is to present one side of the climate change debate.
4.3 Predicted Results of the Model
If we can classify assessments by the goals of the assessors, or in some cases their
authorizers, we can predict how each of these purposes can be furthered by the strategic
treatment of sea level rise due to Antarctic melting. The easiest to predict are the
advocacy assessments. We would expect them to act like lawyers trying to make a case
for guilt or innocence. They will present evidence supporting their side of the debate as
much as possible, and discredit the evidence that the other side of the debate uses, all
within the constraint of maintaining credibility. Let us first focus on those groups
advocating climate change as a cause for concern. These actors want people to protect the
climate, even if doing so involves sacrificing economic growth. Recall from Figure 1 that
people place a higher absolute value on losses than they do on gains. In terms of overall
framing, they will try to frame the benefits from economic activity as gains over the
status quo, and the dangers that climate change prevents as losses. Recall also from
Figure 1 that people are risk taking when it comes to losses—they are willing to accept
the small risk of a large loss more than they are willing to accept a smaller yet more
certain loss. They will want to convince people that the losses from climate change are
relatively certain. Climate change advocates will thus want to portray those losses which
are relatively certain as quite large. They will also want to magnify the likelihood of the
less certain, yet large magnitude, risks. Rapid sea level rise from Antarctic melting falls
into this latter category. We would expect climate change advocates to devote resources
to discussing this risk in order to magnify people’s subjective probability assessment of
its occurring. We would not expect them to focus on this risk to the exclusion of more
certain outcomes.
Next consider advocates on the other side of the issue. As to climate change in general,
we would expect them to frame the status quo as including the economic returns to be
had in the absence of climate change policy. Efforts to control emissions of greenhouse
gases would incur an economic cost, equal to the losses in GDP from reduced
productivity. The global warming that does not occur would be framed as a benefit of
those policies. Since people place a higher absolute value on losses than they do on gains,
to the extent that the climate change debate can be framed in this way people will be less
likely to take action to prevent it. Remember also from Figure 1 that people are risk
averse with respect to gains—they will value the gains much less if they are seen as
uncertain. Advocates will thus want to frame the benefits of climate change policy as
risky; they will portray the negative consequences of high greenhouse gas emissions as
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highly unlikely. We would thus expect them to spend resources to convince people
that the major effects of climate change are the ones subject to uncertainty—such as rapid
sea level rise due to Antarctic melting—and that the probability of that occurring is
insignificantly different from zero. Furthermore, by adopting this strategy, they can
undercut the credibility of those people advocating aggressive policies to combat climate
change. We do not expect them to spend all of their resources on issues such as rapid sea
level rise, since they do not want to bring to much attention to the potential for
catastrophe. Rather, they want to devote enough energy to the issue so that people
perceive of climate change as involving a great deal of uncertainty, yet the potential
problems, such as changes in average temperature. These impacts are smaller and more
subject to natural variation.
Advisory assessments fall into the next group. We expect these assessors to be trying to
be as useful as possible in providing information that is balanced and honest.
Furthermore, to the extent that advocacy groups are sensed as a threat to the legitimacy
and perceived accuracy of this information, we would expect advisory assessors to try
and reveal the advocates’ tactics. In order to provide unbiased information, advisors will
attempt to avoid framing issues in any particular way. We would predict them to explain
the different ways in which the issues can be framed, as well as why advocates on either
side of the debate might to choose to frame the issues in one way or another. If they are to
be useful, advisors must confront those issues which are most susceptible to misleading
problem frames, issues such as rapid sea level rise due to Antarctic melting. Indeed, this
type of issue is an excellent one to use as the context for discussing misperceptions
surrounding risk and uncertainty. At the same time, it is true that many advisory
assessments address only limited aspects of the problem. For instance, the Department of
Energy commissioned a series of studies specifically to address and advise on the issue of
sea level rise. These would devote substantial attention to the issue of the West Antarctic
ice sheet collapse. Other assessments had a different purpose. EPA has prepared advisory
assessments that deal not with the implications of climate change, but with the policy
options and tools for avoiding it. These, we would expect, would not waste pages
devoting serious attention to sea level rise since it is not relevant to their purpose, and
would avoid the issue altogether. We would thus expect advisory assessments to devote a
substantial amount of attention to this type of risk, if they devote any attention at all. We
would not expect them to devote limited attention to the issue.
The final type of assessment is the agreement-seeking assessment, the consensus
document. Like the advisory assessment, the agreement-seeking assessment usually
comes out of an effort to inform policy-makers. Unlike the advisory assessments,
however, the agreement document does not have to compete with the advocacy groups
for attention and legitimacy; consensus assessments tend to be large, lengthy, and
established efforts, which will be respected and quoted because of the fact that they
represent the combined opinion of so many  experts in the field. Thus, they do not have to
respond to every point raised in the advocacy assessments, but can choose to ignore
whole issue areas. Furthermore, like the advocacy assessments, agreement-seeking
assessments are the product of parties with a stake in the climate change debate. Often,
representatives of industry, of governments, and of NGOs participate in the process of
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drafting or reviewing the assessment. While their views may cancel each other
out, and prevent consensus assessments from appearing like advocacy efforts, it is only
the issues on which agreement is reached that typically become a part of the final
document. We would thus imagine that agreement-seeking assessments would focus their
attention on the issues that are well-understood, or where the potential for
misunderstanding is small. For two reasons, we would expect them largely to ignore
issues such as rapid sea level rise from Antarctic melting. First, the parties to the
assessment would be unable to reach agreement among themselves as to the proper
problem frame to place the issue in. Some would insist on its being treated as a major
threat. Others would insist that by discussing it as a serious potential problem, even one
with low probability, they are lending the theory a legitimacy it does not deserve. Second,
the parties would avoid issues such as rapid sea level rise because of the potential
controversy they could bring to the entire assessment. Consensus-seeking assessments are
an attempt to put a certain amount of uncertainty to rest, so that actual policy-making,
based on what knowledge does exist, can begin. Hence we would expect them to focus on
issues where risks are well defined and far from zero. Were the assessors to focus on
issues marked by high levels of uncertainty, the effect might well be for governments that
are reluctant to take action to call for more study, rather than substantive policy. Were the
assessors to focus on issues marked by consensus around low probability and high
impact, there would be a danger of people misinterpreting the risk because of the way
that it was framed. For both of these reasons, we would expect this last class of
assessments to avoid the issue of rapid sea level rise.
We can predict that different assessments will treat extreme outcomes differently. When
we classify assessments according to the three distinct purposes they serve—agreement-
seeking, advisory, and advocacy—we would expect to see variance in treatment of these
issues by group. We would expect advisory assessments to give the greatest treatment of
the issue. We would expect advocacy assessments, on both sides of the issue, to give
moderate treatment to the issue. We would expect agreement-seeking assessments to
ignore the issue. Table 5 summarizes these predictions.
5. Empirical Tests
5.1 Data and Methodology
My data consist of a set of 38 assessments published between 1981 and 1997. I attempt to
include all of the major assessments conducted during this time, as well as a large number
of the smaller assessments. If I omit any particular assessment, it is either because it was
not available to me for review, or because I did not include it in my definition of
assessment. In order to test the hypothesis that assessment type is a good predictor of the
treatment of extreme outcomes, such as a rapid rise in sea level due to the melting of the
West Antarctic ice sheet, I use a multinomial logit regression technique, to generate
estimators for each of my explanatory variables. The primary advantage of this technique
is that it allows me to control for a number of variables, such as the year of the
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assessment and the length of the assessment, in order better to isolate the
effect of the assessment type. By using a qualitative choice regression model, such as the
logit, I can determine whether the effect of the assessment type is significantly different
from zero, and in the direction that the model I have developed would predict. I use the
multinomial logit model because it allows me to set up my dependent variable—
treatment of sea level rise—as a choice among three possible outcomes. Thus it is
possible to have as the dependent variable options no treatment, limited treatment, or
detailed treatment of the issue.
The principal limitation of the multinomial logit technique becomes critical in a data set
such as mine, which has only 38 observations. Often, one is not able to generate results
that are significantly different from zero. I do not encounter this difficulty with these
data, however. A second limitation of the multinomial and standard logit techniques is
that it is difficult to interpret the results. I provide a brief explanation of the regression
models in the footnote to this sentence.iii In this paper, I generally interpret only the sign
and significance, and not the absolute magnitude, of the regression coefficient estimates.
Finally, the results I generate may not be reliable because of the small sample size
involved. As I explain in the footnote, the multinomial and standard logit regression
models assume that the error terms are distributed according to particular distributions.
With large numbers of observations this may not be a bad assumption to make, but with
so few data points, this assumption may not be valid. To correct for this, I use the
bootstrap regression technique, and analyze its results to interpret the reliability of my
maximum likelihood estimators.iv
Clearly one decision is what to treat as an assessment, and thus include in the data. For
this, I turn to the working definition developed by the Global Environmental Assessments
(GEA) project, out of which this paper grew. I treat as an assessment those social
processes that seek to communicate the results of scientific knowledge to policy makers
or the public. It does not include those papers appearing in journals of natural or social
science that seek to expand the knowledge base or derive the biogeophysical, economic,
or political implications of climate change. It does include, however, works that seek to
derive specific policy implications using interdisciplinary research and results.
Assessments are not limited to those performed by a group or team of authors. A major
limitation of my method is that I look only at the published report of the assessment
effort. This ignored the fact that assessment efforts often span years, and that the major
impacts on policy may arise out of informal communication with policy makers during
the assessment process, or through media channels after the assessment is finished.
Because I observe only the actual assessment document, I ignore these other products of
the assessment process. Certainly an area for research is whether the substantive content
of assessments is similar across formal and informal paths of communication.
The second, and greater difficulty is in classifying the type of assessment, according to
the functional definitions—agreement, advisory, and advocacy—that I developed in the
last section. There are two problems that arise. First, I am unable to measure the extent to
which an assessment displays one of the functional characteristics. For instance, we
would expect a document by Greenpeace or the Global Climate Coalitionv to be highly
biased, while assessments coming from organizations like World Resources Institute
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(WRI) or Stockholm Environmental Institute (SEI) to be less driven by
ideology, even taking on the characteristics of advisory documents. It would be nice to
have a model that took into account the degree to which a document assumes a particular
type. If my type variable were simply a binary choice, it might be possible to have it take
on a more continuous distribution. For instance, I could rate each assessment on a scale
of one to ten, with one being the most advocacy oriented, and ten being most agreement
oriented. However, with an independent variable that takes on three potential values, it is
more difficult to define the spectrum over which I will rank the assessments. Indeed, I do
not even try. The second problem is that there is the tendency to classify assessments
according to how they treat certain issues of climate change such as the one I am
studying. If, for instance, a particular assessment could be classified as either agreement
or advisory, such as a work by the NRC, it would be tempting to use the assessment’s
substantive treatment of the specific issues as an indicator of the assessment’s purpose.
This is merely using the model to validate the model. To avoid this, I attempt to classify
each of the assessments strictly in accordance with the criteria in Table 5, and without
regard to the actual substance of the assessment. Judgment calls will surface, but I make
them as transparent as possible by listing how my data are classified. This information
appears in Table 6. I use the agreement oriented assessment as my base case in the
regression models.
A third and related difficulty is classifying the degree of treatment of the dependent
variable by each assessment. One could imagine close judgment calls over whether a
given assessment provided limited or detailed issue treatment. The first step is specifying
the variable itself. I define no treatment as just that – not even mentioning the possibility
of the rapid deterioration of the West Antarctic ice sheet due to climate change. I define
limited treatment as the discussing of the issue, without providing a detailed or balanced
account of the scientific theory and the probabilities associated with the possible
outcomes. I define detailed treatment as a discussion of the issue from a balanced
perspective, presenting the scientific theory, qualified by statements about its likelihood
of occurrence. I attempt to make the best judgment calls possible, and again present those
choices in Table 6. The more difficult judgment call is between limited treatment and
extensive treatment. To address this special concern, I run a separate logit regression,
using any treatment as the dependent variable.
In order to isolate the effect of the assessment type, I control for two other sets of
variables. First, I control for the year in which the assessment was published. This may be
important given the development of the theory surrounding West Antarctica and climate
change. Shortly after Mercer published his paper in 1978, the issue gained widespread
attention. Soon, however, other scientists began publishing findings critical of Mercer’s
hypothesis. We might expect the assessed median probability of the ice sheet’s collapse
to decrease as these later findings were published. Accordingly, we might expect to see
less treatment of the issue by assessments as the years progressed from 1978 onward.
However, we might see a rapid decrease in issue treatment during the time when the
theory lost acceptance, followed by a leveling off. Later, we might expect to see a
leveling off. Two ways of modeling this are by defining the time variable in logs, or by
modeling it as a quadratic function. Having done both, I found the latter method to
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provide a substantially better fit with the data. I thus present coefficients for two
variables: years after 1978, and years2 after 1978.
I also control for the length of the assessment. I define short assessments as those of 100
pages or fewer, medium assessments as those of 100 to 500 pages, and long assessments
as those of more than 500 pages. My expectation is that longer assessments tend to
devote more attention to all of the issues involved in climate change, and thus would be
more likely to devote more space to issues of rapid sea level rise. The reasons I use
dummy variables, as opposed to a single variable for the number of pages are two-fold.
First, it is often difficult to define exactly how long an assessment is, especially if it is
long, with many appendixes. Furthermore, since some assessments appear on the world
wide web, it is difficult to define the number of physical pages. Second, I expect a non-
linear response of treatment to length. The difference between a 50 and a 100 page
assessment is probably much more than the difference between a 600 and a 650 page
assessment. One alternative would be to express the length of the assessment in log form.
Because of the first concern, however, I have chosen not to do this. I found, however, that
the difference between short and medium assessments was significant in all models,
whereas there was no discernible difference between medium and long assessments. In
order to preserve degrees of freedom, I compare only those assessments that are short
with those that are medium and long.
5.2 Results
Table 7 presents the results of two regression models. Model A is a multinomial logit
regression. The left hand column shows the coefficients associated with increased or
decreased likelihood of giving limited issue treatment, compared with no issue treatment.
The right hand column shows coefficients associated with detailed issue treatment, also
compared with no issue treatment. It is difficult to interpret the magnitude of the
coefficients, for their marginal impact on the likelihood of issue treatment depends on the
values of all of the variables. Instead, I focus on significance and sign.
We see that nearly all coefficients are significant, either at the 5% or 10% error level.
Second, we see that both advisory assessments and advocacy assessments are more likely
to give limited issue treatment. The effect is larger for the advocacy assessments.
Assessments were less likely to give limited issue treatment with time, although the
negative coefficient for the years2 after 1978 estimator indicates a decreasing marginal
effect, one that may even change direction. If we look at the second column of Model A,
we see that advisory assessments are more likely to give detailed issue treatment, while
advocacy assessments are less likely than agreement assessments to give detailed issue
treatment. We note an unusually large standard error associated with the advocacy
estimator. This may be due to the absence of a single advocacy assessment giving
detailed issue treatment. The time effect is the same as with the left hand column. As the
pseudo R2 value indicates, Model A explains more than half of the variance in the
dependent variable.
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I present results from a standard logit regression in order to present results that
are robust to the judgment call between limited and detailed issue treatment. These results
appear as Model B in Table 7. We observe results similar in sign and significance to
those of Model A. Furthermore, we do not encounter the difficulty computing a standard
error for the advocate estimator. Instead, we see that both advisory and advocacy
assessments are more likely than agreement assessments to treat the issue at all. The
effect is larger for advocacy assessments, although its estimator is significant only at the
10% error level. Again, the model explains more than half of the variance in the
dependent variable. We notice that the coefficients in Model B resemble quite closely
those of the left hand column of Model A. It would appear that the limited treatment
component of the any treatment variable dominates the results of Model B.
I use the bootstrap primarily to test my earlier results for robustness, because of my
concern that 38 observations may be too small a sample from which to generate
meaningful results. To simplify matters, I run ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions
within the bootstrap.vi Although OLS is not ordinarily used in the context of a binary
choice dependent variable, it typically gives results which qualitatively agree, in terms of
sign and significance, with the more complicated logit techniques. The most important
results from the bootstrap technique are the lower and upper bounds on the 95%
confidence interval. These are obtained using actual percentiles; in the case of a bootstrap
with 1,000 repetitions, they represent the 25th lowest and 25th highest observations,
respectively. These can be compared with the confidence interval bounds calculated in a
single regression, calculated using the standard error and assumptions of normality. In
Table 8, we see that the bootstrap confidence interval lower and upper bounds lie close to
those determined with the single regression. Indeed, we do not observe a single estimator
which is significant at the 5% level in the OLS model, yet not significant when using the
bootstrap. What this demonstrates is that the earlier results are robust to small changes in
the assessments that I include in the data, assuming that the sample of 38 assessments
itself is unbiased.
6. Implications for Assessments and Policy
These empirical results observed in the four regression models are consistent with a
theory that explains variance in extreme event issue treatment by strategic objective.
Essentially, the results show that the type of assessment, defined according the three A’s
that I have discussed, explains some of the variance in issue treatment. Clearly, there
could be other theories of assessor behavior that could explain these results. What this
model does not predict, and what the empirical tests do not address, is how users of
assessments respond to the treatment of extreme events.
Assessment writers can use these results in two ways. First, they can understand the
limitations that users of assessments have in understanding issues of risk and uncertainty.
By applying the lessons of behavioral psychology, assessors can do a better job of
conveying the message they wish to make. For advocates, this means taking advantage of
people’s attitudes towards gains and losses. For advisors, this means paying extra
attention to issues that are subject to misunderstanding. Advisors may want to apply
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many of the recent methods developed in the field of risk communication, so as
better to educate their readers about the tradeoffs involved. For consensus seekers, this
may mean understanding why consensus is difficult to reach on some issues. They may
want to explain, in the assessments, why they have omitted certain areas, and guide the
reader to those advisory assessments that give more comprehensive treatment to the
issue. Alternatively, the leaders of agreement assessment efforts may want to structure
the processes and participation structures to overcome the difficulties associated with
discussing extreme outcomes.
Second, assessors may benefit from knowing that other assessments are acting
strategically in the manner described in this paper. Authors of advisory assessments may
want to alert their readers as to why certain issues receive little treatment in the large,
agreement-oriented assessments. They may also want to be explicit about addressing and
responding to the claims of the advocacy community. Authors of agreement assessments
may benefit from understanding how the limited issue treatment by advocates may
undercut the formation of political consensus. They may also want to address some of the
claims of advocacy assessments.
Policy makers can only benefit from understanding some of the bias present in
assessments. Even if an agreement-oriented assessments steers clear of controversy, bias
can enter in by what the authors choose to assess, and what they choose to ignore. By
knowing that agreement-oriented assessments have a bias towards omitting extreme
outcomes, they can search for those theories in the more advisory-style assessments.
They can understand why certain outcomes of climate change may be important—based
on scientific criteria—yet omitted from the large, agreement oriented assessments. At the
same time they can understand the ways in which advocacy assessments frame extreme
outcomes, and how their treatment of issues to highlight may be other than benign. By
understanding what is happening, policy makers may be less likely to fall victim to these
techniques. Ultimately, policy makers may realize that the best source for information on
extreme events may come out of advisory assessments devoted to particular issues. They
may want to commission advisory assessments to examine those very issues that the
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 Table 2— Stochastically Dominated Options















1% of the time $0 $900 $5,000 $0
10% of the
time
$1,000 $900 $0 $0
89% of the
time
$1,000 $900 $5,000 $5,050
expected
payoff
$990 $900 $4,500 $4,495
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 Table 4 — Factors Important in Risk Perception and Evaluationvii
Factor Condition associated withincreased public concern
Condition associated with
decreased public concern
Catastrophic potential Fatalities and injuries grouped in
time and space
Fatalities and injuries scattered and
random
Familiarity Unfamiliar Familiar




Uncertainty Risks scientifically unknown or
uncertain
Risks known to science
Controllability (personal) Uncontrollable Controllable
Voluntariness of exposure Involuntary Voluntary
Effects on children Children specifically at risk Children not specifically at risk
Effects manifestation Delayed effects Immediate effects
Effects on future generations Risk to future generations No risk to future generations
Victim identity Identifiable victims Statistical victims
Dread Effects dreaded Effects not dreaded
Trust in institutions Lack of trust in responsible
institutions
Trust in responsible institutions
Media attention Much media attention Little media attention
Accident history Major and sometimes minor
accidents
No major or minor accidents
Equity Inequitable distribution of risks and
benefits
Equitable distribution of risks and
benefits
Benefits Unclear benefits Clear benefits
Reversibility Effects irreversible Effects reversible
Personal stake Individual personally at risk Individual not personally at risk
Origin Caused by human actions or failures Caused by acts of nature or God
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to uncertainty among a






written for readers within
the agency or organization
commissioned to assist
specific policy makers in
taking action
paid authors
single or group authored
consultants contracted or
interest group authored
written for readers outside






avoidance of issue to avoid
conflict
full engagement of issue to
reveal framing problems
and to ensure balanced
understanding, or complete
avoidance of issue because
not within scope of work
limited engagement of issue
to frame in manner
consistent with interest





IPCC, NRC DOE, OTA Greenpeace, Marshall
Institute
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 Table 6 — Attributes of Assessments in Data
Year Title Author or Group Country Length Type Treatment
1981 On the assessment of the role of CO2 on
climate variations and their impacts
WCP Intl. short agreement limited
1981 Life on a warmer earth IIASA Intl. short advisory detailed
1981 Global energy futures and the CO2
problem
CEQ US short advocacy limited
1982 On possible changes in global sea level
and their potential causes
DOE US short advisory detailed
1982 Carbon dioxide - emissions and effects IEA Coal Research Intl. medium advisory detailed
1983 Projecting future sea level rise EPA US medium advisory detailed
1983 Carbon dioxide - science and consensus DOE US long advisory detailed
1983 Changing climate NRC US medium agreement detailed
1984 Glaciers, ice sheets, and sea level NRC US medium agreement detailed
1984 Assessing the impact of climatic change in
cold regions
IIASA Intl. short advisory none
1985 Characterization of information
requirements for studies of CO2 effects
White at DOE US medium advisory limited
1985 Detecting the climatic effects of increasing
carbon dioxide
DOE US medium advisory detailed
1987 A matter of degrees WRI US short advocacy none
1987 Responding to changes in sea level NRC US medium agreement none
1987 Climate impacts and public policy UNEP and IIASA Intl. Short agreement none
1988 Greenhouse effect, sea level rise, and
coastal wetlands
EPA US medium advisory detailed
1988 Workshop on sea level rise and coastal
processes
DOE US medium advisory detailed
1988 Developing policies for responding to
climatic change
WCP Intl. short agreement none
1989 The potential effects of global climate
change
EPA US medium advisory limited




Intl. Medium agreement none
1990 Climate change — the IPCC response
strategies
IPCC Intl. medium agreement none
1990 The greenhouse trap WRI US medium advocacy limited
1990 Policy options for stabilizing global
climate
EPA US long advisory none
1991 Changing by degrees OTA US medium advisory limited
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1991 Climate change: science, impacts, and
policy
UNEP Intl. long agreement none
1992 Policy implications of climate change NRC US long agreement limited
1992 Climate change: the IPCC 1990 and 1992
assessments
IPCC Intl. medium agreement limited
1992 Confronting climate change SEI Intl. medium advocacy limited
1993 Preparing for an uncertain climate OTA US medium advisory none
1993 Climate change action plan: technical
supplement
DOE US medium advisory none
1993 Climate change 1992 IPCC Intl. medium agreement none
1995 Climate change 1994 IPCC Intl. medium agreement none
1995 The probability of sea level rise EPA US medium advisory detailed
1995 Climate change in Asia: executive
summary
ADB Intl. medium advocacy limited
1996 Climate change and the insurance industry EES US short advisory none
1996 Climate change 1995 IPCC Intl. long agreement none




US short advocacy none
1997 Polar Meltdown Greenpeace Intl. short advocacy limited
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 Table 7 — Maximum Likelihood Estimation Results
A B




















































**   Significant at 0.05 probability level
 *   Significant at 0.10 probability level
(standard errors in parentheses)
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 Table 8 — Standard and Bootstrap Regressions









































numbers on top result from single least-squares regression
numbers on bottom result from bootstrapped least-squares regressions































 Figure 2 — Relationship between Objective and Subjective Probabilitiesix
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 Figure 4 — Antarctic Ice Shelves
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Endnotes
                                                
i
 The author wishes to thank the following people for their comments, advice, and suggestions: William
Clark, Jill Jaeger, Sheila Jasanoff, Joanne Linerooth-Bayer, Edward Parson, and Richard Zeckhauser
ii
 According to Bernstein (1996), they chose the name “prospect theory” not because it clearly described
their theory, but because it was a name that people were likely to remember and use.
iii
 For those not familiar with the multinomial logit model, I discuss briefly its derivation and mathematical
form. It is based on an assumption that actors choose the outcome of a qualitative dependent variable, such
as outcome 1, 2, or 3, according to the utility that they derive from each of those choices. Those utilities, in
turn, are a function of a vector of characteristics attributable to the particular actor, plus some level of
random disturbance, not accounted for by the model. We assume that an individual will choose outcome 1
if the utility of that choice exceeds the utility of the second and third choices for that individual. Likewise,
the individual will choose outcome 2 if the utility of that choice exceeds the utility of first and third choices
for that individual. What we observe in the data are a choice of outcome for each individual actor i, as well
as the vector of personal characteristics for each actor. The multinomial model, then, seeks to pick those
parameter vectors of for each outcome, β 1, β 2, and β 3, that maximize the likelihood of observing the data.
This is not difficult to do if we assume an extreme value distribution for the error terms. Then, the












































With the parameter estimates in hand, we can calculate the probability that any given actor with a vector of
personal characteristics xi will choose each of the three possible outcomes. Note that the three probabilities
must, by definition, sum to one. For each of the parameters within the vector β , we can test for sign and
significance.
The logit regression model is merely is specific case of the multinomial logit model, a case in which the
dependent variable has only two possible outcomes. It is built on the assumption that the probability that an
individual i, in this case a particular assessment, will choose a given outcome, is a function of a set of
characteristics, the vector xi, and random disturbance term. If we assume that the two error terms are
independent and distributed according to an extreme value function, than we can set their difference equal
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Again, we normalize by setting one of the two possible outcomes as the base case, against which we
measure the probability of observing the other outcome. To calculate that, we need to use the functional
form of the prior equation, a function of the product of our coefficient vector β i and our vector of personal
characteristics, xi. As this product becomes very negative, the probability approaches zero; as the product
becomes very large, the probability approaches unity.
iv
 The bootstrap technique is a method that uses computer simulation to give more accurate measures of key
statistics and their potential range of values. It is most useful when the standard assumptions underlying
statistical models may not hold. One such case is where the sample size available is quite small, which it is
in this paper. In performing a bootstrap, the computer draws a random “pseudo-sample” from the original
data. In drawing the pseudo-sample, the computer uses replacement of observations. Thus, if my original
sample has 38 observations, the computer will draw a random pseudo-sample, also of 38 observations, but
which may include some of the original observations more than once, or not at all. The computer then
calculates the statistics needed on the pseudo-sample. After this, the computer replicates this process a
specified number of times. For a small sample size, the bootstrap technique tests the robustness of results to
omission of one or more observations, and is thus useful. For more information on the validity of
bootstrapped data, see Mooney and Duval (1993).
v
 The Global Climate Coalition is a trade organization composed of representatives from industries
threatened by policies seeking to protect the climate. It engages in lobbying and the preparation of
assessments.
vi
 The functional form of the logit and multinomial logit models creates problems when trying to bootstrap
these data. Occasionally, the computer draws a pseudo-sample in which all of the observations contain the
same value for either the advisory or advocacy variables. The computer is not able to compute an estimator
for that variable, and must drop it in that pseudo-sample. Doing so, of course, leads to biased bootstrap
results. The use of an ordinary least squares regression technique avoids this difficulty.
vii
 This list appears in similar form in Covello 1991, page 112.
viii
 This figure appears in similar form in Kahneman and Tversky 1992, page 174.
ix
 This figure appears in similar form in Margolis 1996, page 81.
x
 This figure appears in similar form in Margolis 1996, page 76.
